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Summary
Compositional techniques such as Assume-Guarantee Reasoning (AGR) are be-
lieved to be promising ways to alleviate the state space explosion problem associ-
ated with model checking in the “divide-and-conquer" style.
In this thesis, we present a comprehensive and extensible framework, namely
CELL, to facilitate compositional verification of concurrent and real-time sys-
tems based on commonly used semantic models. For each semantic model, CELL
offers three libraries, i.e., compositional verification paradigms, learning algo-
rithms and model checking methods to support various state-of-the-art compo-
sitional verification approaches. With well-defined APIs, the framework could
be applied to manufacture customized model checkers. In addition, each library
could be used independently for verification or program analysis purposes. We
have built three model checkers with CELL. The experimental results show that
the performance of these model checkers can offer similar or often better perfor-
mance compared to the state-of-the-art verification tools.
In addition to the tool itself, we also present a compositional verification tech-
nique that is included in the framework namely Assume-Guarantee Abstraction
Refinement (AGAR) for real-time systems, which is to apply AGAR composi-
tional verification paradigm on real-time systems. In this thesis, we will show the
detailed algorithm and prove the correctness and termination of it. The algorithm
is operated on Timed Transition System (TTS), which is the underlying semantic
model of multiple real-time modelling languages such as Timed Automata (TAs).
Finally, we conclude the thesis and discuss several future research directions with
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regards to the current work.
Keywords: Formal Verification, Model Checking, Compositional Verification,
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Over the past few decades, the pace of advancement in information technol-
ogy has been truly remarkable. This has ushered in a new era in the society,
where our productivity and daily lives are crucially reliant on various software
and hardware systems, e.g., the Internet, embedded systems, mobile devices and
so on. These systems are becoming more and more complicated, especially for
concurrent and real-time systems, which have concurrent executions, shared re-
sources and real-time requirements. Among them, some systems like electronic
commerce, rocket controller systems and medical instruments would bring catas-
trophic consequences should there be a failure. In December 1996, the Ariane 5
rocket exploded 40 seconds after take-off, which was caused by an overflow of
a 64-bit floating point number that was converted to a 16-bit signed integer. An-
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other example was the bug in Intel’s Pentium II floating-point division unit, in the
early nineties, which caused a loss of about 475 million US dollars and severely
damaged Intel’s reputation as a reliable chip manufacturer. Such examples are too
numerous to list; thus the need for reliable systems is crucial. For these crucial
applications, it is hardly to ensure the reliable system implementation with regards
to the complexity. This fact motivates several methodologies in validating system
designs from an early stage.
The principle validation methods for complex systems include simulation, testing
and model checking. Simulation and testing check the systems’ behaviours on a
set of test cases. They both are heavily involved in today’s system development.
However, sampling test cases are insufficient in finding all the potential bugs,
especially for concurrent and real-time systems which have more complicated
system behaviours. According to Dijkstra, testing and simulation can only show
the presence, but not the absence of errors [20]. Intuitively, the well-tested systems
still cannot guarantee error free. The negative examples that are showed above
could reveal this fact since testing and simulation with extremely large test cases
must have been performed on them.
Model checking is a method of automatically verifying concurrent systems that
are modelled by finite state models, and it is an algorithmic verification and de-
bugging [32] method. Given a system model and a property as correctness re-
quirements for this system, the automatic verifying procedure always terminates
with yes/no answer for that if the system model satisfies the property. Moreover,
a counterexample is returned if the model does not satisfy the property. Users are
able to refine their system designs according to the information derived from the
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counterexample. Due to its powerful functionality, model checking has achieved
great success in finding errors for industrial systems. For instance, Intel i7 CPU
was verified purely with model checking techniques [57]. State space explosion
is the primary problem that limits the usage of model checking. The number of
global states of a concurrent system with many processes can be enormous. A
system consisting of n processes, each having m states, may have mn states glob-
ally. From a complexity-theoretical point of view, this problem is unavoidable
in the worst case. For years, combating the state space explosion problem has
been the driving force in the research of model checking. Important techniques
include partial order reduction, symmetric reduction, symbolic model checking,
abstraction refinement loop and compositional verification.
Compositional verification technique is a “divide-and-conquer" approach for in-
ferring global properties of a system from the properties of its components with-
out constructing the complete state space for the system model. It is believed
to be a promising way to tackle the state space explosion problem and plenty of
approaches have been proposed for compositional reasoning concurrent [18, 25,
37, 26, 15], real-time [61, 49] and even probabilistic systems [42, 58]. To apply
compositional verification is not simple. These approaches can be characterized
into different paradigms, and these paradigms need to work with different learn-
ing/abstraction refinement techniques and different model checking methods (i.e.,
explicit-state model checking and symbolic model checking). It is thus necessary
to have a framework to apply, experiment and compare these methods systemat-
ically. In the following section, we will give an overview of our works and the
corresponding contributions.
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1.2 Summary of Contributions
The main results of this thesis are embodied in the design and implementation of
the Compositional vErification and Learning Library (CELL) [1], a framework
to validate concurrent and real-time systems via various compositional verifica-
tion approaches automatically. The contributions of this thesis are summarized as
follows:
• We survey different compositional verification approaches and observe that
any of them comprises three components, i.e., a compositional verification
paradigm, a learning algorithm and a model checking method. With this
observation, we design and implement the CELL framework based on com-
monly used semantic models for concurrent and real-time systems and offer
three libraries, which provide functionality of the three components of com-
positional verification approaches. In this way, various state-of-the-art com-
positional verification approaches can be constructed by combining items
from the libraries. As far as we know, CELL is the first framework that sup-
ports various compositional verification approaches for both concurrent and
real-time systems. We define and implement sets of APIs for components
of CELL. With these APIs, users are allowed to apply CELL to build cus-
tomized model checkers as well as apply APIs of components individually
to go through other verification or program analysis purposes. We manage
to develop three model checkers with CELL. The experimental results show
that CELL is capable of verifying systems with large numbers of potential
global states. Moreover, CELL is designed to be a generic framework, and
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it can be easily extended to support new languages syntax as well as appro-
priate algorithms for the libraries to support new verification approaches.
• Compared to the compositional verification approaches for concurrent sys-
tems, the approaches for real-time systems are relatively few. To this end,
we develop another automatic compositional verification approach based on
abstraction refinement technique and assume-guarantee reasoning (AGR)
for real-time systems. The technique operates on Timed Transition System
(TTS), in terms of which semantics of multiple state-of-the-art real-time
modelling languages can be defined. The proposed verification approach,
namely Assume-Guarantee Abstraction Refinement (AGAR) for real-time
systems, consists of a compositional verification flow based on the AG-NC
proof rule and uses the CEGAR approach to automatically generate real-
time assumptions needed by AGR. We prove the correctness and termina-
tion of the AGAR approach for real-time systems. The experimental results
confirm the practices of this technique. Finally, this approach is embedded
into CELL to serve as one option for the verification of real-time systems.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the back-
ground and preliminaries, as well as literature reviews of the state-of-the-art com-
positional verification approaches. Chapter 3 presents the CELL framework, in-
cluding its design, implementation and usages. Chapter 4 introduces the AGAR
approach for real-time systems. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and discusses the
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relationship among the two works. Several possible future research directions are
discussed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Backgrounds and Preliminaries
This chapter contains the preliminary knowledge for this thesis as well as liter-
ature reviews for related works. Section 2.1 briefly introduces model checking.
Section 2.2 explains the compositional verification for concurrent systems. The
compositional verification concepts for real-time systems are discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3. In Section 2.4, tools related to CELL are summarised.
2.1 Basics of Model Checking
Although testing and simulation are widely used as validation methods, they face
limits that they may become very expensive for complex, asynchronous systems.
More importantly, they are only able to cover a subset of possible behaviours.
Model Checking [31, 77, 32, 33] is an automatic approach to explore complete
7
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(or equivalently complete) state spaces of the targeted hardware or software sys-
tems design models to find violations of given properties like deadlock. Several
successful model checkers, such as SPIN [53], FDR [21] and NuSMV [29], are
proposed to verify formal models of systems. Rather than using those, with the
development of more efficient model checking algorithms, model checking tech-
niques have been recently applied to software source codes for analysis. Microsoft
proposed SLAM [13] for model checking C program while Java Pathfinder [48]
is developed for verifying Java program.
In this section, we focus on explaining model checking basics for untimed concur-
rent systems. In Section 2.3, we show how real-time considerations are involved.
The rest of this section covers system modelling, property specification and veri-
fication, which are the three main parts of the model checking process.
2.1.1 System Modelling
A prerequisite for model checking is a formal model of the system under con-
sideration. It is critical to abstract away details of the system design due to the
limitations on time and memory. On the other hand, relevant or important points
must be represented in the model. Thus, provision of such a model is not simple.
In general formal modelling, quantitative timing is abstracted away, which can be
expressed in terms of sequence of system behaviours.
A state (or configuration) is an instantaneous description of the system that cap-
tures program counter and the values of the variables at a particular instance of
time. Results of a state change are described as a transition, which is a pair of
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states with an action (event) linking hem. With such a state transition model, a
computation of a system is a finite or infinite sequence of events, which is regarded
as a trace of actions of the system. The set of all the possible traces consists a for-
mal language of the system model, which describes the acceptable behaviours of
the system. We use Labelled Transition System (LTS) to formally model a system.
LTS is a standard model to represent hardware and software system designs [12].
It serves as the semantic model for various high-level modelling languages, such
as Promela [53], which is adopted by SPIN model checker.
Definition 1 (Labelled Transition Systems) An LTS is a tupleM = (Act, S, S0, ↪→
) where Act is a set of labels (actions); S is a set of states; S0 ⊆ S is a set of ini-
tial states and ↪→⊆ S ×Act× S is a labelled-transition relation. All the actions
on an LTS constitute the alphabet of the LTS. The language of M is defined in the
standard way as the set of traces (i.e., sequences of events), as L(M).
To model a system with multiple system components, LTSs can be composed by
parallel composition. Given two LTSs Mi = (Acti, Si, S0i , ↪→1) for i ∈ {1, 2},
their parallel composition is the LTS M1 ‖ M2 = (Act1 ∪ Act2, S1 × S2, S01 ×
S02 , ↪→′) where ↪→′ is defined as follows, where α ∈ Act1 ∪ Act2:
(M1,M2)→ α(M ′1,M ′2) if α ∈ Act1 ∩ Act2
(M1,M2)→ α(M ′1,M2) if α ∈ Act1 and α 6∈ Act2
(M1,M2)→ α(M1,M ′2) if α 6∈ Act1 and α ∈ Act2
Intuitively, the parallel composition operator ‖ is a commutative and associative
operator that combines the behaviours of two components by synchronizing the
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actions common to their alphabets and interleaving the remaining actions. In the
setting of parallel composition, it supports multiple synchronization, which means
more than two LTSs are able to synchronize the actions at the same instance of
time.
2.1.2 Specification and Verification
Specifications are properties that the system model must satisfy, which are catego-
rized as safety properties and liveness properties. In this thesis, we mainly focus
on verifying the safety property.
Intuitively, a safety property is a property that “something bad never happens".
Generally, safety requirements include the absence of deadlocks (deadlock free)
and identified critical states (reachability) that may crash the system.
Given a safety property, we specify it as a safety LTS P , whose language L(P )
defines the set of acceptable traces over the action set (alphabet) of P . An LTS
satisfies P , denoted as M |= P , if only if all the traces from M , is inclusive in P ,
over the alphabet of P . Thus, the model checking problem is reduced to language
inclusive checking problem. The decision procedure for language inclusion typ-
ically involves the complementing of the specification LTS, which in turn relies
upon determination. If the relation does not hold, traces that violate the relation
are returned as the counterexamples. Considering that language inclusive check-
ing is expensive, it can be replaced by checking whether a simulation preorder
relation is held between them [41], but the replacement is not complete.
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2.2 Compositional Verification for Concurrent Sys-
tems
To alleviate the state explosion problem [31, 77], compositional verification tech-
niques [34, 16] advocate "divide-and-conquer" approaches to conduct verification.
The intuition is that it is not necessary to explicitly combine the components of
the system since the result could be potentially too large to be held in memory.
For instance, Assume-Guarantee Reasoning (AGR) [51, 55, 34] is a typical com-
positional verification technique. The following non-circular (AG-NC) proof rule
is the most commonly used one in model checking based on AGR.
M1 ‖ A |= ϕ
M2 |= A
M1 ‖M2 |= ϕ
The basic idea is that if M1 satisfies the property ϕ under the assumption A and
M2 can guarantee the assumption A, then we can conclude that M1 ‖M2 satisfies
the property ϕ. Using this proof rule, less memory is needed as A is usually quite
smaller than M2 and it results in a smaller state space by combining M1 with A
instead of with M2. AGR leads to continous efforts in research on compositional
verification techniques. Once proposed, AGR began to be adopted as a promising
way to effectively verify complex systems by manually defining the assumptions.
As manually generating assumption is a way which may cause errors, researchers
have come out of various methods which AGR can run automatically. The essen-
tial ideas are to apply learning or abstraction refinement algorithms to generate
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and refine the assumptions.
In his thesis [35], J.M Cobleigh classified compositional verification techniques
into two categories, i.e., compositional construction and compositional reasoning.
In addition, he presented a decent survey for each category, which mainly were
not automatic approaches, e.g., manually constructing assumptions for AGR.
We focus on automatic compositional verification approaches in this thesis, which
we categorize as Learning based Assume-Guarantee Reasoning (LAGR), Sym-
bolic Learning based Assume-Guarantee Reasoning (SLAGR), Assume-Guarantee
Abstraction Refinement (AGAR) and Compositional Abstraction Refinement (CAR)
based on their working mechanisms.
2.2.1 Learning Based Assume-guarantee Reasoning
In the seminal work [37], J.M. Coleigh adopted the L∗ algorithm [11] to incre-
mentally learn the assumption for AGR. Following this line, there have been vari-
ations [8, 80, 43, 25, 47, 27] that addressed to optimize or extend this approach.
The learning algorithm produces finite-state automata, which is utilized as as-
sumption by LAGR. L∗ is an on-line learning algorithm that produces prefix-
closed, minimal and complete deterministic finite-state automaton that can be eas-
ily transformed into LTS. Not onlys L∗, other learning algorithms can also be used
in this context. For an instance, NL∗ produces non-deterministic finite-state au-
tomaton that is potentially smaller than the deterministic one, but determination
procedure is necessary once language inclusion checking is needed.
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Figure 2.1: Learning Based Assume-guarantee Reasoning [37]
As shown in Figure 2.1, LAGR adopts a learning algorithm, e.g., L∗, to learn the
assumption incrementally. In each iteration i, the learning algorithm generates a
LTS as the assumption Ai, the two steps of the compositional verification rules
are applied with it. In step 1, it checks whether M1 guarantees the property P
under the assumption Ai, and this could be solved by a classical model checker as
it is basically a model checking problem. If the result is false, the counterexample
would be used to strengthen the assumption generated in iteration i + 1. The
assumption Ai+1 should at least not exhibit the violating behaviour reflected by
this counterexample. If the result is true in step 1, step 2 is applied, which is
to discharge Ai on M2. If it returns true, we can safely assume the property is
satisfied. Otherwise, it should analyse the counterexample to identify whether it
is a real counterexample. If the counterexample is found spurious, it should be
used to weaken the assumption. And in assumption Ai+1, the system behaviour
presented by the counterexample would be allowed. The algorithm iterates until a
conclusive result is achieved.
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LAGR is a breakthrough in researches of compositional verification since it is
the first purely complete automatic compositional verification approach. For most
cases, it demonstrates reasonable performance.
2.2.2 Assume-guarantee Abstraction Refinement
Proposed in [18], Assume-Guarantee Abstraction Refinement (AGAR) exploits
the abstraction refinement method, e.g., Counterexample Guided Abstraction Re-
finement (CEGAR) [30], to abstract the component and incrementally refine it to
act as the assumptions for AGR.
An abstraction A of concrete LTS C is a LTS such that there exists a surjection
called the abstraction function, that maps each concrete state to an abstract state.
From the definition of abstraction, it follows that the abstraction defines a weak
simulation relation between concrete LTS and the abstraction LTS, consequently
C |= A holds and it also indicates that the language of C is included in that of
C. It remains to check M1 ‖ A |= ϕ, where M1 presents the other parts in the
system besides C. To find a reasonable abstraction, typical abstraction refinement
method such as CEGAR can be exploited.
The workflow is shown in Figure 2.2. Assume M2 is the component to be ab-
stracted and M1 to be the rest parts of this system. Initially, it obtains an initial
abstraction of M2, denoted as M̂2. In each iteration, M̂2 is composed with M1 and
check whether it satisfies the property. If the result is “true", we can conclude the
property is satisfied by the system. Otherwise, the counterexample would be to
check whether it is spurious; if yes, the counterexample would be used to refine
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Figure 2.2: Assume Guarantee Abstraction Refinement
the abstraction. In the work [18], the authors adopted the famous CEGAR [30]
approach to generate and refine the abstraction. Other abstraction refinement tech-
niques are also feasible for this task, e.g., Evolutionary Abstraction Technique
(EAT) [2].
AGAR is an alternative automatic compositional verification approach proposed
after LAGR. Unlike LAGR, AGAR does not constrain assumptions’ determina-
tion or closure. Therefore, the assumptions constructed with AGAR can be expo-
nentially smaller than those obtained by learning, resulting in smaller verification
problems.
2.2.3 Symbolic Learning Based Assume-guarantee Reasoning
In the work [26], the authors proposed a purely implicit solution to the assump-
tion generation for AGR. Although symbolic model checking [23, 72] had already
been associated with AGR via LAGR paradigm [8, 80], SLAGR is naturally dif-
ferent as it simply generates contextual assumptions implicitly by employing an
exact learning algorithm for Boolean functions (CDNF algorithm [22] in [26]).
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUNDS AND PRELIMINARIES 16
In this way, SLAGR is able to seamlessly leverage the symbolic model checking
technique.
Symbolic Model Checking
Symbolic model checking [23, 72] has been proved to be powerful in combat-
ing the state space explosion. It avoids explicit construction of the state spaces.
The set of states and the transitions are expressed as boolean formulas. Binary
Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [3] are used to present such boolean formulas [23],
typically. In addition, boolean formula can be presented as conjunction normal
forms (CNFs) and SAT-solvers can be consulted to check if the specification is
held with the model.
Symbolic model checking method is used by most “industrial strength" model
checkers as it can handle much larger models by avoiding explicitly enumerating
all the states.
Automated Assume-guarantee Reasoning through Implicit Learning
The workflow of SLAGR is similar with LAGR. The difference is that LTS mod-
els need to be encoded into boolean formulas first. Then the boolean formula
learning algorithm is invoked to learn the targeted assumption that is presented
with boolean formula. Instead of explicit-state model checking methods, sym-
bolic model checking methods, i.e., BDD-based model checking or SAT-based
model checking, should be used.
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By leveraging the power of symbolic model checking, SLAGR often outperforms
LAGR and AGAR who adopt the explicit-state model checking.
2.2.4 Compositional Abstraction Refinement
Unlike the aforementioned three AGR paradigms which avoid constructing the
whole systems from components, Compositional Abstraction Refinement (CAR) [15,
24] intends to build but abstractly.
Similar with AGAR, CAR also exploits the power of abstraction refinement, but
it does not use the abstraction as the assumption for AGR. The idea of CAR is to
compute abstraction Mˆi for each concrete model Mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, individually.
Let M1,M2, . . . ,Mn be n components and Mˆ1, Mˆ2, . . . , Mˆn be their abstractions,
respectively, then L(M1 ‖ M2 ‖ · · · ‖ Mn) ⊆ L(Mˆ1 ‖ Mˆ2 ‖ · · · ‖ Mˆn). This
tells us that the behaviours of the parallel composition of the concrete models
are included in the behaviours of the parallel composition of their abstractions
[24]. Various abstraction refinement techniques are proposed for computing the
abstractions, i.e., CEGAR, EAT.
Initially, the abstraction refinement technique generates abstractions Mˆi for each
concrete model Mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n individually. If Mˆ1 ‖ . . . ‖ Mˆn |= ϕ, it returns
(true, λ) where λ is an empty string, and we can conclude M1 ‖ . . . ‖ Mn |= ϕ.
If Mˆ1 ‖ . . . ‖ Mˆn 6|= ϕ with a counterexample pi and pi↓Σi (the counterexample
that projected on the alphabet Σi) is not spurious inMi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it returns
(false, pi) and, we can conclude that M1 ‖ . . . ‖ Mn 6|= ϕ. If pi↓Σi is spurious in
Mi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, pi↓Σi is used to generate refined abstraction Mˆi+1, which
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would be used in the next iteration. The whole process iterates until it reaches a
conclusive result.
Compared to the compositional verification approaches based on AGR which
mainly adopt the non-circular proof rule, CAR has the advantages that it does
not need to partition the system into two parts. Whether the system is partitioned
well has a high impact on the performance of the verification as indicated in [36],
so it is kind of advantage to avoid partitioning.
2.3 Compositional Verification of Real-time Systems
Computing devices are frequently used in critical applications where predictable
response times are essential for correctness. Such systems are called real-time
systems. Quantitative time has been abstracted away in common model check-
ing, but it is counterproductive when reasoning about systems that must interact
with physical processes. It is necessary to be able to specify and verify real-time
models of quantitative times. The demand for compositional techniques of such
real-time systems is greater than that of untimed concurrent systems because the
state space gets larger due to the time dimension. We introduce the basics of
model checking real-time systems before zooming into corresponding composi-
tional techniques.
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2.3.1 Model Checking Real-time systems
There are two types of real-time semantics in the definitions of real-time systems,
discrete-time semantics [9] and dense-time semantics [5]. The essential difference
is about the readings of the time. Discrete-time semantics require that all time
readings are integers and all clocks increment their readings at the same time,
whereas the dense-time semantics supports the readings to be rational numbers
or real numbers and all clocks increment their readings at a uniform rate. Com-
pared to discrete-time, dense-time is the natural model for asynchronous systems
because the separation of events can be arbitrarily small. In addition, no assump-
tions are necessary to be made for the speed of the environment when this model
of time is assumed. In discrete-time modelling, it is necessary to separate time
by choosing some fixed time quantum so that the delay between any two events
will be a multiple of this time quantum. This may limit the accuracy with which
systems can be modelled. Also, the choice of a sufficiently small time quantum
to model an asynchronous system accurately may blow up the state space, so that
verification is no longer possible [65]. In this thesis, we only discuss dense-time
semantics.
A number of specification languages are proposed for dense-time semantics, e.g.,
Timed Automata (TAs) [6], Event Recording Automata (ERAs) [7], Timed Pro-
cess Algebra [90, 79] and Time Statecharts [54]. Among them, TA has become
the standard modelling technique for designing real-time systems. TAs are finite
state machines equipped with clocks variables. The running time can be modelled
by clock variables updating, and execution of the model can be constrained by
real-time guard expressions. Timed Transition System (TTS) [50] is proposed to
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generalize the specification languages, and it serves as the underlying semantics
of TAs. Intuitively, TTS is LTS equipped with a bit of additional structure to cap-
ture relevant information about real-time behaviour. A set of clock variables are
used to record the passage of time. Transitions are guarded by the current values
of the relevant clock variables. A TTS accepts a set of timed words.
Definition 2 (Timed Words) Let Σ be a finite alphabet. A timed word over Σ
is a finite sequence wt = (a1, t1)(a2, t2) . . . (an, tn) of symbols ai ∈ Σ for i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} that are paired with nonnegative real numbers ti ∈ R+ such that the
sequence t1t2 . . . tn of timed stamps is nondecreasing.
Definition 3 (Timed Transition Systems) Let < be the set of positive rational
numbers. A TTS is a transition system M = (Act ∪ <, S, S0, ↪→) where Act is a
set of discrete events; S is a set of states; S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states; and
↪→⊆ S× (Act∪<)×S is a transition relation. Notice that a transition label can
be either an event in Act or a rational number d in < which denotes the event of
time elapsing for d time units. System actions have no duration in time, and they
are interleaved with the clock actions, which advance by nonuniform amounts.
Transitions with system actions are constrained by minimal and maximal time
delays with the transactions.
The underlying semantics of TTS T is actually a LTS. We write LTS(T ) for the
associated LTS of T . The parallel composition of TTSs is defined as the parallel
composition of the associated LTS. We remark that transitions labelled with a
number must be synchronized as well as the system actions. Given two TTSs
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Ti = (Acti ∪ <i, Si, S0i , ↪→i) for i ∈ {1, 2}. They are compatible iff they share
the same sets of clock variables, i.e., <1 = <2. Their parallel composition is the
TTS T1 ‖ T2 = (Act1 ∪ Act2 ∪ <1, S1 × S2, S01 × S02 , ↪→′) where ↪→′ is defined
as follows, where α ∈ Act1 ∪ Act2:
(M1,M2)→ α(M ′1,M ′2) if α ∈ Act1 ∩ Act2
(M1,M2)→ α(M ′1,M2) if α ∈ Act1 and α 6∈ Act2
(M1,M2)→ α(M1,M ′2) if α 6∈ Act1 and α ∈ Act2
(M1,M2)→ d ∈ <(M ′1,M ′2)
Similar with parallel composition of LTSs, TTS parallel composition synchronizes
common actions in multiple TTSs and interleaves the rest. We remark that the
transitions with system actions in resulted composed TTS get the guard condition
from intersections of the original ones from the source TTSs.
However, TTS itself is hardly useful for model checking as it is always infinite-
state. In order to obtain a finite representation, abstraction techniques such as
clock regions [4] and clock zones [40] are presented. These techniques are able to
transform the infinite-state TTSs to their associated LTSs which have finite states.
A TTS is deterministic iff it has at most one start state and for each state with
multiple outgoing transitions that associated with the same system action, these
transitions have mutually exclusive delay constraints. Deterministic TTS can be
used as the requirement specification for real-time systems. The real-time model
checking problem is reduced to language inclusive checking problem between the
models and the requirement specification TTS.
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A number of model checkers for real-time systems have been developed, e.g. UP-
PAAL [59], KRONOS [91] and Rabbit [17]. In the rest of this section, we briefly
introduce the LAGR and CAR compositional techniques for verifying real-time
systems.
2.3.2 Learning Based Assume-guarantee Reasoning for Real-
time Systems
In the work [61], the authors proposed a LAGR approach for real-time systems
modelled by Event Recording Automata (ERAs), which are determinizable class
of TAs. ERAs can be presented as TTS and are sufficiently expressive to model
many interesting real-time systems. This approach consists of a compositional
verification based on the non-circular assume-guarantee (AG-NC) proof rule and
uses a learning algorithm, TL∗ [60], to automatically learn real-time assumptions
for AGR.
As shown in Figure 2.3, TL∗ consists of two phrases, namely untimed verification
phase for constructing the untimed assumption by L∗ algorithm, which is a deter-
ministic LTS, for M1 to satisfy the property. Then the real-time verification phase
refines the untimed assumption into a real-time one by adding timed constraints
onto the transitions. In LAGR for real-time systems, the learning algorithm in-
tends to construct a real-time assumption which could act as a good assumption
to conclude the result of the real-time verification. In the work [61], the authors
adopted the TL∗ algorithm to learn a deterministic ERA which is associated with
a deterministic TTS to act as the real-time assumption. TL∗ is not the only fea-
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Figure 2.3: LAGR Flow for Real-time Systems [62]
sible learning algorithm to learn real-time systems. In [45], the authors presented
three learning algorithm to learn ERA. These algorithms adopt one phrase learn-
ing procedure.
The target real-time assumption to be learned is the weakest assumptionAw under
which M1 satisfies the property. To learn the weakest assumption Aw, real-time
model checking (e.g., zone-based model checking) is used to answer the member-
ship and candidate queries needed by the learning algorithm.
As discussed, the limitation of LAGR is that the learning algorithm needs the
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targeted real-time model to be determinizable. It is known that the general TA
cannot be determinized, except the deterministic TA. It is also the reason that the
authors choose ERA as the targeted model, which is a subclass of TA.
2.3.3 Compositional Abstraction Refinement for Real-time Sys-
tems
Several works have been proposed to extend CEGAR approach to handle real-
time systems [39]. In [49], He et al. extended CEGAR approach on TAs via CAR
paradigm. The overall flow is similar with the CAR paradigm for concurrent sys-
tems. Timed step simulation relation is defined from a TTS T1 to another TTS
T2. Intuitively, each transition in T1 is mimicked by a transition in T2. And the
abstraction relation is defined in terms of timed step simulation. The difference
between CAR in TTS and LTS is that the adopted abstraction refinement tech-
niques should generate and refine abstraction for TTS instead of LTS as well as to
analyse the counterexample which involves real-time constraints. The verification
problem for a real-time system is usually based on a zone graph with its scale in
the worst case being equivalent to the size of the system’s region graph. Since the
number of regions in a region graph is exponential with the number of clocks and
the state space grows exponentially to the number of real-time components that
are involved, simple but relatively efficient abstraction strategies for TTSs could
be abstracting clock variables away and aggregating locations.
Similar with LTS, CAR paradigm with TTS does not need the system to be par-
titioned into two parts for non-circular rule of AGR. In addition, compared to
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LAGR, this approach can operate on non-determinizable model such as TAs.
2.4 Related Tools
Some existing tools are related with CELL. Giannakopoulou et al. proposed an
AGR plugin [44] with the LTSA tool [71] which was based on the L∗ algorithm.
In [14], Bensalem et al. proposed a tool named D-finder that used compositional
verification techniques to detect and verify deadlocks with systems. In [49], He
et al. proposed a prototype called CAREF which incorporated Uppaal [59]. For
probabilistic systems, Komuravelli et al. [58] proposed a compositional tool based
on the probabilistic model checker PRISM [52] which combined AGR and the
CEGAR approach. Furthermore, learning libraries which help AGR have been
proposed. The libalf library [19] is an open-source library for learning finite-state
automata covering various well-known learning techniques such as L∗. Learn-
Lib [78] is another framework for learning automata. BULL [28] is a boolean
function learning library which can help SLAGR.
To the best of our knowledge, CELL is the only stable and publicly available
compositional verification framework. Based on CELL, we adopt the PAT frame-
work [85, 69, 74] to develop three compositional model checkers for fast proto-
typing and reusing the user interface components like editors and simulators.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUNDS AND PRELIMINARIES 26
2.4.1 PAT Model Checking Framework
PAT (Process Analysis Toolkit) [85, 69, 67, 70] is a self-contained environment
to support composing, simulating and reasoning of system models. Various model
checking techniques catering for checking deadlock-freeness, divergence-freeness,
reachability, LTL properties with fairness assumptions [86], refinement check-
ing [83, 66, 89] are supported. PAT has been implemented with advanced opti-
mization algorithms like multi-core scalability [68], partial order reduction, sym-
metry reduction [92] and BDD-based model checking [74, 75, 76]. In addition,
PAT extensively supports modelling and verifying real-time [84] and probabilis-
tic systems [82, 88, 87, 81]. In addition, PAT is extended to support many other
applications [63, 93, 64, 46, 10].
PAT comes with user friendly interfaces, a featured model editor and an animated




We propose a comprehensive and extensible framework named CELL (Compo-
sitional vErification and Learning Library) [1], which contains various state-of-
the-art compositional verification approaches for concurrent and real-time sys-
tems based on commonly used semantic models (i.e., Labelled Transition System
(LTS) for concurrent systems and Timed Transition System (TTS) [50] for real-
time systems). For each semantic model, CELL offers three libraries, i.e., com-
positional verification paradigms (e.g., Learning based Assume-guarantee reason-
ing (LAGR), Compositional Abstraction Refinement (CAR)), learning algorithms
(e.g., L∗, CDNF) and model checking methods (e.g., explicit-state model check-
ing and symbolic model checking). Various state-of-the-art compositional verifi-
cation approaches can be constructed by combining items from each library. For
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of CELL
instance, the compositional verification approach proposed in [37] can be achieved
by combining LAGR compositional verification paradigm, the L∗ learning algo-
rithm and an explicit-based model checking method. CELL can be extended in
multiple ways, e.g., with new semantic models (e.g., Markov Decision Processes
(MDP)), new compositional verification paradigms, learning algorithms or model
checking techniques. Figure 3.1 shows the overall architecture of CELL. Note
that the light-color part in the right of the figure shows how CELL can be (or is
being) extended to support probabilistic systems.
One usage of CELL is to experiment and compare different compositional veri-
fication approaches. Based on CELL, we report a comparison upon the perfor-
mance of different techniques by case studies on industrial systems. To the best of
our knowledge, it is the first time such an evaluation that compares different com-
positional verification techniques has been reported. The other usage is simply to
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use it as a library to develop model checkers with compositional verification capa-
bility. CELL is designed to be language independent. There exist many specifica-
tion languages practically applied in verifying concurrent and real-time systems.
To develop a model checker for a specified language deploying compositional ap-
proaches, developers can apply CELL, as long as their language has a semantic
model which is supported by CELL, i.e., LTS (for instance, Promela [53]) or TTS
(for instance, Timed Automaton). Developers are allowed to achieve this by the
APIs provided with the semantic model layer of CELL. With the well-defined
APIs, we manage to develop three model checkers for both concurrent and real-
time systems. The performance of these model checkers through case studies
confirms the effectiveness of our design and implementation.
In the rest of this chapter, we present details of CELL’s four layers in Section 3.1.
Section 3.2 shows the implementation details of CELL. Section 3.3 evaluates
CELL with case studies and Section 3.4 concludes this chapter.
3.1 CELL Architecture
Our goal is to provide a framework supporting compositional verification for dif-
ferent domains. To make our framework flexible and extensible, a four-layer ar-
chitecture is proposed as shown in Fig. 3.1. The layered-structure reduces the
coupling between different functionality by providing a set of general interfaces
between different layers, which will be described in the following sections. With
the defined APIs from the semantic model layer, domain experts are allowed to
easily manufacture model checkers with various compositional verification ap-
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proaches to alleviate the state explosion problem. Furthermore, the APIs of the
lower layers are well defined so that they can be used independently for various
purposes. In the following, we give details of each part in the framework.
3.1.1 Semantic Model Layer
In this layer, we support common semantic models (i.e., LTS for concurrent sys-
tems and TTS for real-time systems), which basically comply with the definitions
in Chapter 2. Any modelling language whose semantic model is LTS or TTS can
be verified using our framework. We remark that for TTS semantics, we provide
an option for determinizable TTS, which the idea is borrowed from Event Record-
ing Automata (ERA) by restricting the usage of clock variables. For each action
in the alphabet of the TTS, an event-recording clock is associated with it. Each
event-recording clock is implicitly and automatically reset to 0 when a transition
with the associated event is taken. If the determinizable option is enabled with
TTS, it is then closed under complement, and the language-inclusion problem is
decidable.
In CELL, we assume for systems, which have LTS or TTS semantics, both the sys-
tem and the requirement specification (property) are represented in LTS or TTS 1.
Currently, CELL supports the compositional verification of safety properties. In
CELL, Lts and Tts interface classes are the representations of the semantic mod-
els, which contain a set of initial states and optionally global variables and chan-
nels. Developers are expected to express the semantics of their targeted specifica-
1For real-time system, we assume the property is determinizable. It is preferable to use deter-
ministic TTS or determinzable option.
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M1 ‖ A |= ϕ
M2 |= A
M1 ‖M2 |= ϕ
(a)
M1 ‖ A1 |= ϕ
...
Mn ‖ An |= ϕ
A1 ‖ A2 ‖ . . . ‖ An |= ϕ
M1 ‖ . . . ‖Mn |= ϕ
(b)
Figure 3.2: Proof Rules for Assume-Guarantee Reasoning
tion languages by inheriting proper interface class and implementing the abstract
methods, such as MakeOneStep, which encodes the small-step operational seman-
tics in order to generate the state space on-the-fly. Under the semantic model,
various state-of-the-arts compositional verification approaches are provided to be
invoked easily. There compositional verification approaches are constructed by
combining appropriate items from the three libraries under this layer.
3.1.2 Compositional Verification Paradigm Layer
Compositional verification paradigm layer contains the typical patterns of compo-
sitional verification approaches that we have categorized and presented in Chap-
ter 2. As shown in the second layer of Figure 3.1, we provide LAGR, AGAR
and CAR for both semantic models. In addition, we provide SLAGR for LTS
model, which may reduce the state space for some models by leveraging the
symbolic model checking techniques. Implementations of compositional veri-
fication paradigms define the interfaces for extending learning algorithms and
model checking methods. For an instance, both AGAR and CAR call the ab-
straction generation and refinement methods from an interface class. With the
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newly developed EAT abstraction refinement technique [2] that has implemented
the interface class, CELL immediately supports two compositional verification
approaches for AGAR and CAR methods. For AGR based compositional verifica-
tion, i.e., LAGR, AGAR and SLAGR, besides the non-circular AG-NC proof rule
as described in Fig. 3.2 (a), a circular AGC proof rule, as shown in Fig. 3.2 (b),
can also be applied in AGR. Technical details of these compositional verifica-
tion paradigms have been briefly discussed in Chapter 2 except for the AGAR
paradigm with real-time systems, which would be covered in Chapter 4.
3.1.3 Learning Algorithm Layer
To construct the assumptions or abstractions needed by compositional verifica-
tion, several works have been proposed based on different techniques. In this
layer, we build these state-of-the-art techniques for automatic construction of the
assumption. The current implementation includes the following: the L∗ algorithm,
the TL∗ algorithm, the CDNF algorithm, the EAT technique and the CEGAR ap-
proach.
The L∗ algorithm [11] is a formal method to learn a deterministic finite automata
(DFA) that accepts an unknown language U over an alphabet Σ. During the learn-
ing process, the L∗ algorithm interacts with a Minimal Adequate Teacher to make
two types of queries: membership queries and candidate queries. A membership
query asks whether a string is in the unknown language U . A candidate query asks
whether a candidate DFA accepts the unknown language U . To apply in LAGR,
membership query and candidate query are basically reduced to two model check-
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ing problems. In CELL, we shape the L∗ algorithm to work with the LTS semantic
models.
The TL∗ algorithm [60] is a real-time extension of the L∗ algorithm. It learns an
ERA which is a determinizable real-time model that accepts an unknown timed
language UT . During the learning process, the TL∗ algorithm also has to interact
with a Minimal Adequate Teacher to make four types of queries: (untimed or real-
time) membership queries and (untimed or real-time) candidate queries, which
are with the two phrases of the learning process, i.e., untimed learning phrase and
real-time learning phrase. Similar with L∗ algorithm, these four types of queries
can be answered by concurrent and real-time model checking methods. In CELL,
we apply the TL∗ algorithm on the optional determinizable TTS instead of ERA.
The CDNF algorithm is a formal method to learn a boolean function whose truth
value is equivalent to an unknown boolean function ψ. During the learning pro-
cess, CDNF needs to interact with a Minimal Adequate Teacher to make mem-
bership and equivalence queries. A membership query asks whether a truth as-
signment satisfies the unknown boolean function ψ. An equivalence query asks
whether the truth value of a candidate boolean function is equivalent as the un-
known boolean function ψ. CDNF algorithm is applied with the SLAGR com-
positional verification paradigm. Each LTS is encoded into two boolean function
that present initial state and transitions. Two runs of CDNF algorithm are needed
to cope the two boolean functions.
The above techniques are used to automatically infer the assumption A needed by
AGR provided that the Teachers can answer the queries required by these tech-
niques. An alternative approach is to gradually construct an assumption based
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on abstraction refinement techniques (i.e., CEGAR [30] and EAT [2]). CEGAR
itself is a verification technique to alleviate the state space explosion problem. To
check whether M |= ϕ holds, CEGAR constructs an abstraction Mˆ , which is an
over approximation of M whose state space is expected to be smaller than M ,
and model checking is performed on the abstraction Mˆ . If Mˆ |= ϕ, then we can
also conclude that M |= ϕ holds. If a counterexample pi is found in Mˆ against
ϕ, pi is further analysed. If pi is also feasible in M , then we can conclude that
M 6|= ϕ. If pi is not feasible in M , i.e., spurious, the abstraction Mˆ is refined
according to the counterexample pi. The refinement of abstractions constitutes a
loop and continues until we get a conclusive result. The CEGAR approach can
also be used to infer the assumption A needed by AGR. The idea is that the ab-
stract model can serve as an assumption. In [18], it shows how AGAR can be
designed so as to use CEGAR to generate and refine the assumptions. In addi-
tion, works [15, 49] present how we could utilize CEGAR to do compositional
abstraction refinement (CAR). CEGAR approach for real-time systems has been
discussed in several works [39, 49]. The usual idea is to construct an abstraction
of a real-time system that a timed step simulation relation exists between it and the
concrete model and refine the abstraction with the real-time counterexample re-
turned by the real-time model checking method. In Chapter 4, we discuss how to
use such real-time CEGAR technique to work with AGAR paradigm for real-time
systems.
Evolutionary Abstraction Technique (EAT) [2] is an alternative abstraction re-
finement approach, which aims to increase the probability of finding better ab-
stractions based on genetic algorithms. EAT provides an encoding of abstraction
(modelled by LTS) and evaluates how good an abstraction is by several criteria
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determined by some characteristics a good abstraction Mˆ usually hold, i.e., the
abstraction Mˆ should include all the behaviours of M , the number of states of Mˆ
is small and Mˆ should reject all the spurious counterexamples. The abstractions
are generated by applying several genetic operators such as Selection, Crossover
and Mutation, which are dynamically selected during the procedure. In this way,
the abstractions are generated based on the evaluations such that the generated
abstractions are not affected by the counterexamples returned by a model checker.
The performance of EAT is confirmed with the experimental results, which often
outperforms the CEGAR technique. This novel abstraction technique is imple-
mented in the learning library of CELL and can be easily used by combining with
CAR or AGAR compositional verification paradigms. The technical detail about
EAT can be found in [2].
Although these learning algorithms are designed for compositional verifications,
they can be applied for other purposes as the APIs associated with these algo-
rithms are well defined. For an instance, users can use the CDNF algorithm to
derive loop invariants [56].
3.1.4 Model Checking Method Layer
In this layer, we provide a variety of model checking methods, which are used by
the compositional verification approaches.
Explicit-state model checking Given an LTS as a model (which are often gen-
erated on-the-fly) and an LTS as a property, CELL provides an efficient algorithm
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based on the latest anti-chain technique to check that the model satisfies the prop-
erty by establishing a refinement relationship [89]. The algorithm return Yes if the
error state defined in the property LTS is not reachable. Otherwise, it returns a
trace of system actions as the counterexample.
Symbolic model checking In CELL, we support both BDD-based symbolic
model checking and SAT-based bounded model checking, which can potentially
handle much larger state space than explicit-state model checking. Uniform en-
coding and symbolic composing methods are provided. The composed symbolic
LTS can be used as input for both symbolic model checking approaches. We
adopt the library developed in [74] to model check LTS models for the BDD case.
MiniSAT is the SAT solver used for the bounded model checking.
Zone-based model checking for TTS As mentioned above, a TTS has infinitely
many states/transitions due to the dense space of time. In CELL, we support zone
abstraction (based on the DBM library developed by the UPPAAL group [59]) so
as to construct (on-the-fly from a modeling language rather than the TTS itself) a
finite-state abstraction of the TTS. Then the abstraction of the TTS can be model
checked with the LTS explicit-state model checking algorithms.
Unlike monolithic model checking, compositional verification needs to invoke
the model checking methods more than one time in one verification procedure as
compositional verification incrementally and automatically processes towards the
conclusive results through learning or abstraction refinement, which usually loop
several rounds. In each round, the model checking method should be consulted.
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Therefore, the efficiency of these model checking methods is crucial.
Same with the learning algorithms, these model checking methods are also ready
for other purposes. To be concrete, users are allowed to use our symbolic algo-
rithms to encode and verify other systems.
3.1.5 Compositional Verification Approaches
Under each semantic model, compositional verification paradigms, learning algo-
rithms and model checking methods can be mixed and matched to construct com-
positional verification approaches. Notice that not every combination is effective.
For an instance, CDNF algorithm should work with symbolic model checking
method. The arrows in Fig. 3.1 show the relationship. Currently, CELL supports
seven different verification approaches for LTS and three for TTS. We briefly list
them as follows.
LAGR + L∗ + Explicit-state Model Checking The L∗ algorithm is used to infer
the assumption automatically. Let us recall the AG-NC proof rule in Fig. 3.2 (a).
The answer to the candidate query of a candidate assumption A is yes only if the
following two conditions hold: M1 ‖ A |= ϕ and M2 |= A, which are basically
two model checking problems. This is basically an implementation of the work
in [37].
SLAGR + CDNF + SAT-based Model Checking For symbolic compositional
verification, LTS models are encoded as boolean formulas, and the CDNF algo-
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rithm is used to learn two boolean functions representing the initial state and the
transitions of assumption LTS A. The answer to the equivalence query of a can-
didate assumption A represented by two boolean functions is yes only if the fol-
lowing two conditions hold: M1 ‖ A |= ϕ and M2 |= A, which can be checked by
SAT-based model checking. Interested readers can refer to [26] for more details.
SLAGR + CDNF + BDD-based Model Checking CELL supports SAT-based
and BDD-based techniques for symbolic model checking. Since CDNF yields
input of conjunction normal form (CNF), a translation layer that transfers between
CNF and BDD is added.
AGAR + CEGAR + Explicit-state Model Checking The CEGAR approach
can be used to infer the assumptions for AGAR paradigm. By using the CEGAR
approach, the assumption A is always constructed as an abstraction of M2, which
means that M2 |= A always holds, and only M1 ‖ A |= ϕ needs to be checked.
Interested readers can refer to [18] for more details.
CAR + CEGAR + Explicit-state Model Checking The CEGAR approach can
also be used to generate and refine abstractions for CAR paradigm. Instead of
combining all the concrete components, we replace them with the abstract models
generated by CEGAR individually. The combined LTS is checked by the explicit-
state model checker. The spurious counterexample is used to refine the abstraction
individually by CEGAR. Interested readers can referred to [15] for more details.
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AGAR + EAT + Explicit-state Model Checking Since EAT is an alternative
abstraction refinement technique, we can replace the positions of CEGAR with
EAT smoothly to generate abstractions for AGAR. The advantage is that EAT has
proven ability to find better abstractions in order to further save verification time
and memory.
CAR + EAT + Explicit-state Model Checking Compared to AGAR, EAT is
more feasible for CAR paradigm. AGAR approach needs to partition the system
into two groups and combine each part to be a single component. As EAT needs
to evaluate the abstraction which is time consuming, it prefers small abstractions.
There is no need to partition and combine components for CAR paradigm. Thus
EAT can easily deal with the individual small components.
LAGR + TL∗ + Zone-based Model Checking For LAGR style real-time com-
positional verification, the TL∗ algorithm is used to infer the real-time assumption.
The answer to the candidate query of a candidate assumption A is yes only if the
following two conditions hold: M1 ‖ A |= ϕ and M2 |= A, which are basically
two model checking problems. Interested readers can referred to [61] for more
details.
CAR + CEGAR + Zone-based Model Checking Similar with the concurrent
systems, the real-time CEGAR approach can be used to infer the assumptions for
real-timed systems. Thus, we are able to incorporate it with CAR paradigms and
utilize zone-based model checking to check. Interested readers in this approach
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can refer to [49] for more details.
AGAR + CEGAR + Zone-based Model Checking As CEGAR can be used to
generate and refine abstraction for TTS, the abstraction is used as the real-time
assumption for AGAR paradigm. We develop this approach and the details are
shown in Chapter 4.
One particularly important issue for AGR with AG-NC proof rule is how to par-
tition a system. For instance, given a system with n ≥ 2 components, to apply
the AG-NC proof rule, the components have to be partitioned into two groups.
The choice of partition strategy has huge implication on the efficiency of compo-
sitional verification, as shown in [36]. Note that this choice of partition strategy
could be closely related to the choice of proof rules. In CELL, we provide several
partition strategies listed as follows (which can be extended):
• SimpleTwoWayPartition: Following the original order of the models given
by the user, the first half of the models are classified into group M1 and the
rest are classified into group M2.
• CommonEventsTwoWayPartition: All the components having the same events
with the property are classified into group M1 and others are classified into
group M2.
• ManualPartition: Users can specify the partition manually.
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3.2 Implementation
CELL is implemented using C# language and Microsoft .NET framework 4.0.
Starting from 2011, the latest version 0.3 of CELL has 54K LOC. CELL is an
open source library under LGPL v3 license in the format of dynamic linked library
(DLL) with no GUI, and it is used through calling the APIs.
The implementation of CELL strictly follows the four layer design we mentioned.
APIs for each single library are provided, users can find the complete API list on
the website. As CELL intents to provide compositional verification techniques
to support model check the customized system models, detailed documents are
available to guide users to implement based on CELL. The most basic interface
class in CELL is Lts (for concurrent system), users are supposed to parse there
system model to feed into the Lts class and as well as implement important call-
back method like MakeOneMove to command CELL how to traverse the state
space graph. Users then can simply call the implemented compositional verifica-
tion approaches to check their models. A simple testing project which shows how
to work with CELL dll binary are also available on the website.
To demonstrate that CELL can be readily used to develop compositional model
checkers, we adopted the PAT [85] framework and developed three model check-
ers for three different modelling languages. The three model checkers are listed
as follows.
• CLTS: a compositional verifier for Finite State Machines with shared vari-
ables. Any compositional verification methods for LTS-based are supported
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in this model checker.
• CERA: a compositional verifier for the network of ERAs. System models
and properties are all specified in ERAs. Users can choose all the TTS-
based compositional verification approaches to verify.
• CTA: a compositional model checker for the network of TAs. AGAR and
CAR approaches are supported in this model checker.
Figure 3.3: GUI of CLTS Model Checker
Figure 3.3 shows a simple component modelled by CLTS, where a double circle
represents the initial state and a state labelled with “A" represents an accepting
state. Figure 3.4 shows a model in CERA, where clock constraints can be added
as guard condition for transitions.
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Figure 3.4: GUI of CERA Model Checker
It is non-trivial to measure how easy to use CELL. However, we have built those
model checkers within one month, which shows that our design is promising. An-
other feature of CELL we shall mention is its extensibility. Thanks to the layered
structure, we can create new verification approaches easily by adding proper items
into any of the three bottom layers in the architecture. For instance, by simply
adding the EAT into the learning algorithm layer, we earn two additional verify-
ing approaches by combining EAT with CAR or AGAR and explicit-state model
checking method, which can be finished within weeks. Currently, we support
ten compositional verification approaches by such combining way. The CELL
DLL binary file together with the source code, complete APIs description docu-
ment, user manual and three abovementioned model checkers are available on the
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website [1]. Moreover, as a tutorial to develop model checkers using CELL, the
progress of developing CLTS model checker is also available.
3.3 Case Studies and Evaluations
We use the CLTS and CERA model checkers to perform case studies and evalu-
ate the capability of CELL. We model and verify several flexible manufacturing
systems (FMS) [38]. A FMS produces blocks with a cylindrical painted pin from
raw blocks and raw pegs. It consists of six kinds of devices, namely convey-
ors, mills, lathes, painting devices, robots, and assembly machines. The devices
are connected through buffers, and the capacity of each buffer is one part. We
modelled four different FMS systems. Figure 3.5 shows the overall flow of the
simplest, FMS-1 system. It consists of five components, namely, a conveyor, two
robots, a mill, and an assembly machine. Each buffer should not overflow or un-
derflow. Figure 3.6 shows the overflow of FMS-2 system, which consists of nine
components, namely two conveyors, four robots, a mill, a lath, and an assembly
machine. Figure 3.7 presents the FMS-3 system, which consists of ten compo-
nents, and it is very similar to FMS-2 except that one additional painting device
is included in the second production line. Figure 3.8 shows the overall flow of
the most complex system, FMS-4. It includes three production lines consisting of
fourteen components.
We applied CLTS to model and verify the four systems. Table 3.1 shows the
verification results. We show results collected from subset of the verification
approaches, which are CEGAR-based AGAR, L∗-based LAGR, CEGAR-based
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CAR, EAT-based CAR, CDNF-based (with BDD) SLAGR. For each run, we
recorded the running time (in seconds) and the number of visited locations in
the peak verification round, ROM means running out of memory (all the settings
will be the same for TTS part). It is obvious that all the compositional verification
approaches outperform the monolithic approach to a great extent. CDNF-based
SLAGR has better performance since it takes advantage of symbolic model check-
ing. Compared to AGAR and LAGR, CEGAR-based CAR seems to be without
any superiority. But with EAT, CAR can finish verification tasks with smaller
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Case |L| Time |L| Time |L| Time |L| Time |L| Time Time
FMS-1 192 0.01 72 0.01 36 0.01 17 0.01 12 0.03 0.01
FMS-2 97,136 4.71 1,260 0.08 1,260 0.07 1,260 0.03 27 0.05 0.06
FMS-3 312,064 12.77 1,920 0.11 1,260 0.08 3,936 0.73 20 0.17 0.12
FMS-4 ROM ROM 24,744 6.93 26,320 2.61 4,656 5.37 530 0.22 0.14
scale state space and less running time.
We also tried the classical dining philosopher problem to test the scalability of
each approach. The dining philosopher problem illustrates a simple resource shar-
ing problem in concurrent programs. Nodes are connected in a ring. Neighbouring
nodes share a resource. A node needs both resources shared with its neighbours
to enter its working mode.
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Table 3.2: Verification Results of Dinner Philosophers problems
Monolithic AGAR LAGR CAR SLAGR
Case |L| Time |L| Time |L| Time |L| Time Time
DP-16 44,135 4.78 875 0.17 875 0.11 400 0.28 0.16
DP-20 481,439 72.25 2.890 0.18 2,890 0.42 500 0.35 0.18
DP-24 ROM ROM 9,545 2.96 9,545 1.49 550 0.43 0.22
DP-30 ROM ROM 20,824 11.95 20,824 7.03 700 0.87 0.51
DP-34 ROM ROM 68,777 40.07 68,777 24.18 750 0.95 0.62
DP-38 ROM ROM ROM ROM 227,155 99.43 900 1.01 0.76
DP-40 ROM ROM ROM ROM ROM ROM 1000 1.21 1.07
DP-120 ROM ROM ROM ROM ROM ROM 8,000 683.21 583.85
|P |: number of processes; |L|max: number of visited locations; ROM: out of memory
In this case, we verify that any pair of neighbouring philosophers cannot enter
their working modes simultaneously. The verification results of multiple pairs
of dinner philosopher are shown in Table 3.2. Due to limited space, we show
results from the subset of the verification approaches, i.e., CEGAR-based AGAR,
L∗-based LAGR, EAT-based CAR, CDNF-based (with BDD) SLAGR. All the
compositional verification approaches outperform the monolithic approach. In
addition, the SLAGR with CDNF and CAR with EAT perform better than the
others. They can handle the systems composed by 120 processes of philosophers
and forks.
We modified the FMS systems to be real-time systems by adding real-time con-
straints that the output of each buffer should be within three time units after its
input. We used CERA model checker to model and verify the modified FMS
systems. We show results from all the three approaches in Table 3.3, which re-
spectively are CEGAR-based AGAR, TL∗-based LAGR and CEGAR-based CAR.
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Table 3.3: Verification Results of Real-time Systems
Monolithic AGAR LAGR CAR
Case |L| Time |L| Time |L| Time |L| Time
FMS-1 212 0.13 36 0.02 36 0.01 36 0.02
FMS-2 97,136 7.49 1,260 0.29 1,260 0.13 1,260 0.02
FMS-3 312,064 23.39 1,920 0.35 1,528 0.19 3,936 1.42
FMS-4 ROM ROM 24,744 30.93 26,320 5.13 24,744 12.81
Observe that all the compositional verification approaches outperform the mono-
lithic approach. Among these three approaches, no one has significant better per-
formance than the others. We studied and found that the learned assumptions
or abstractions were unnecessarily complicated. This motivates us to apply EAT
technique to find better abstractions for TTS, which could be in the next release.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the design and implementation of CELL frame-
work, which contains various compositional verification approaches for concur-
rent and real-time systems. The performance evaluation on the model checkers
built with CELL confirm the promising implementation. In addition, CELL is de-
signed to be extensible. We plan to extend CELL to support probabilistic systems
in the near future.
Chapter 4
AGAR for Real-time Systems
In the previous chapter, we presented a compositional verification framework,
namely CELL, to support compositional verification for concurrent and real-time
systems. In this chapter, we not only intend to present a new technique which is
included in CELL but also show how a compositional verification approach would
work, since the techniques presented in the previous chapter were not in detail.
The demand for compositional techniques for real-time systems is greater than
that for untimed concurrent systems because the state space gets even larger due
to the time dimension. In addition, relatively fewer approaches have been pro-
posed to address the real-time aspect due to the complexity of dealing with quan-
titative real-time semantics. To this end, we develop another compositional veri-
fication technique to complement the approaches for real-time systems based on
Assume-Guarantee Reasoning (AGR). To apply AGR, the construction of assump-
tion needs to be automatic. As a solution, we propose a technique, named Assume
49
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Guarantee Abstraction Refinement (AGAR) for real-time systems that are mod-
elled by Timed Transition Systems (TTSs). It is based on the non-circular proof
rule and uses the CEGAR approach to automatically refine assumptions for AGR.
We prove the correctness and termination of the proposed AGAR approach. This
approach has been implemented in CELL as one option to support compositional
verification for real-time systems.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 reviews necessary
background knowledge. The proposed automatic AGAR approach is described
in Section 4.2. Discussions and conclusions about this work are presented in
Section 4.3.
4.1 Preliminaries
We have illustrated some basic preliminaries of model checking real-time systems
as well as several compositional verification approaches in Chapter 2. In this
section, we review some important preliminaries and give some more necessary
preliminaries of this work.
Let Σ be a finite alphabet. A timed word over Σ is a finite sequence wt =
(α1, t1)(α2, t2) . . . (αn, tn) of symbols αi ∈ Σ for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} that are paired
with non-negative real numbers ti ∈ R+ such that the sequence t1t2 . . . tn is non-
decreasing. Given another alphabet Σ′ ⊆ Σ, we use wt↓Σ′ to denote the timed
word obtained by removing from wt all pairs (αi, ti) such that αi 6∈ Σ′.
LetC be a set of clocks where a clock is a variable over non-negative real numbers
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R+. We assume that all clocks evolve linearly at the same rate. A clock constraint
g is defined as g = x ∼ c | g ∧ g where x ∈ C, ∼∈ {<,≤,=, >,≥}, and c ∈ N.
A clock constraint g identifies a |C|-dimensional hypercube JgK ⊆ (R+)|C|. We
use GC to denote the set of all clock constraints over C.
A clock valuation γ for a set C of clocks is a function γ : C 7→ R+ that assigns
to each clock x ∈ C a non-negative real number. We use ΓC to denote the set of
all clock valuations over C. Given a constant d ∈ R+ and a clock valuation γ, we
use γ + d to denote the valuation such that (γ + d)(x) = γ(x) + d for all x ∈ C.
Given a set of clocks ρ ⊆ C, we use γ[ρ 7→ 0] to denote the valuation γ′ such that
γ′(x) = 0 for all x ∈ ρ and γ′(y) = γ(y) for all y ∈ C \ ρ.
Definition 4 (Clock Satisfication) Given a clock valuation γ ∈ ΓC and clock
constraints g, g′ ∈ GC , the relation |= is defined as follows:
γ |= true
γ |= x ∼ c if γ(x) ∼ c for x ∈ C and ∼∈ {<,≤,=, >,≥}
γ |= ¬g if γ 6|= g
γ |= g ∧ g′ if γ |= g ∧ γ |= g′
TTS has been defined in Chapter 2, which is more from the theoretical aspect.
Here we redefine the TTS more from the practical aspect in order to clearly show
the abstraction refinement procedure. These two definitions are basically equiva-
lent.
Definition 5 (Timed Transition Systems) A TTS is a tuple T = (Act, C, L, L0, Lf , ↪→
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) whereAct is a set of system actions; C is a set of positive rational numbers which
present the clock variables; L is a set of locations; L0 ⊆ L is a set of initial loca-
tions; Lf ⊆ L is a set of accepting locations and ↪→⊆ L× L× Act× RC ×GC
is a transition relation. An edge (l, l′, α, r, g) ∈ T , also denoted by l [g]α{r}−−−−→ l′,
represents that a system transits from location l to location l′ with system ac-
tion α if the clock constraint g holds, and sets of clock variable operations r
are performed, which are restricted to be reset to 0. A TTS T is deterministic if
|L0| ≤ 1, |Post(l, α, g)| ≤ 1 where Post(l, α, g) = {l′ ∈ L | l [g]α {r}−−−−→ l′}, and if
l
[g1]α {r1}−−−−−→ l′ and l [g2]α {r2}−−−−−→ l′′, then l′ 6= l′′ and Jg1K ∩ Jg2K = ∅.
Definition 6 (Computation of TTS) A computation σ of a TTSM = (Σ, C, L, L0, Lf , ↪→











· · · αn−→
tn
(ln, γn)
with li ∈ L and γi ∈ ΓC for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, satisfying the following requirements:
• l0 ∈ L0 and γ0(x) = 0 for all x ∈ C
• there is a transition li−1
[gi]αi{r}−−−−−→ li such that γi−1 |= gi and γi = (γi−1 +
ti − ti−1)[ri] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
A run σ is an accepting run if ln ∈ Lf . A timed word wt is accepted by T if T has
an accepting run over wt. The timed language accepted by T , denoted by L(T ),
is the set of all the timed words accepted by T .
The redefinition of TTS is equivalent with the one in Chapter 2, here we separate
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the notion of state into two parts, i.e., location and clock variable. They basically
accept the same timed language under the same condition.
Definition 7 (TTS Parallel Composition) Given two TTSsMi = (Σi, Ci, Li, L0i , L
f
i , ↪→i
) for i ∈ {1, 2}, their parallel composition is the TTS M1 ‖M2 = (Σ1 ∪ Σ2, C1 ∪
C2, L1 × L2, L01 × L02, Lf1 × Lf2 , ↪→) where the transition relation ↪→ is defined as
follows.
(l1, l2)
[g1∧g2]α{r1∪r2}−−−−−−−−−→(l′1, l′2) if Jg1∧ g2K 6= ∅, l1 [g1]α{r1}−−−−−→ l′1 and l2 [g2]α{r2}−−−−−→ l′2
(l1, l2)
[g1]α{r1}−−−−−→ (l′1, l2) if l1
[g1]α{r1}−−−−−→ l′1 and α /∈ Σ2
(l1, l2)
[g2]α{r2}−−−−−→ (l1, l′2) if l2
[g2]α{r2}−−−−−→ l′2 and α /∈ Σ1
Example 1 A real-time I/O system consists of two components, INPUT and OUT-
PUT. The two components are modelled by two deterministic TTSs,Min andMout,
as shown in Figs. 4.1 (a) and (b), respectively. Initially, Min performs an input
action within one time unit. Then it notifies Mout by performing an send action
within one time unit after the input action and waits for an acknowledgement
from Mout. After receiving a notification, Mout performs an output action within
one time unit, and then it acknowledges Min by performing an ack action within
one time unit after the output action. The parallel composition Min ‖ Mout is as
shown in Figure 4.1 (c).
In this work, we assume system models and properties are all represented by TTSs
and we assume the property TTS is deterministic. A real-time safety property is
specified by a safety TTS as formulated in Definition 8. The satisfaction relation
between TTSs is formulated in Definition 9.





























Figure 4.1: I/O system
Definition 8 (Safety TTS) Let τ be a special error location without outgoing
transitions. A TTS M = (Σ, C, L, L0, Lf , ↪→) is safe if it is deterministic, Lf = L
and τ 6∈ L.
Definition 9 (Satisification of TTS) Given two TTSs Ti = (Σi, Ci, Li, L0i , L
f
i , ↪→i
) for i ∈ {1, 2}, we say T1 |= T2 if L(M1)↓Σ2 ⊆ L(M2) where L(M1)↓Σ2 =
{wt↓Σ2 | wt ∈ L(M1)}.
Given a safety property ϕ represented by a safe TTS Mϕ = (Σ, C, L, L0, Lf , ↪→
), we can always construct an error TTS M¬ϕ = (Σ, C, L ∪ {τ}, L0, {τ}, ↪→′)
representing ¬ϕ, the negation of ϕ, where the transition relation T ′ is as follows:
T ′ = T ∪ {(l, τ, α, ∅, g) | (l, l′, α, r, g) 6∈ T for l, l′ ∈ L, α ∈ Σ}
A model checking problem M |= Mϕ can be rephrased as an emptiness problem
of L(M1 ‖ M¬ϕ). Figure 4.2 (a) shows a timed safety property ϕ, represented by
a safe TTS Mϕ, requiring that the first action should be input, and then input and
output actions should be alternated. In addition, the time difference between any
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two consecutive actions should be less than five time units. The corresponding
error TTS M¬ϕ representing the negation of ϕ is as shown in Figure 4.2 (b). It is
obvious that the I/O system, as shown in Figure 4.1, satisfies the safety property
ϕ.
P0 P1
[z ≤ 5] input {z}
[z ≤ 5] output {z}
(a) Safe TTS Mϕ
P0 P1
τ
[z ≤ 5] input {z}
[z ≤ 5] output {z}
output,
[z > 5] input input,
[z > 5] output
(b) Error TTS M¬ϕ
Figure 4.2: Safety Property and Its Negation
As described in Chapter 2, the underline of TTS is basically (labelled transition
system) (LTS).
Definition 10 (Labelled Transition Systems) A LTS is a tupleL = (Act, S, S0, ↪→
) whereAct is a set of labels (actions), S is a set of states, S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial
states, and ↪→⊆ S × Act× S is a transition relation.
Given a TTSM = (Σ, C, L, L0, Lf , ↪→), its associated LTS isL = (Act, S, S0, ↪→
) where Act = Σ ∪ R+, S = L × ΓC , S0 = {(l0, γ) | l0 ∈ L0 and γ(x) =
0 for all x ∈ C}, and the transition relation ↪→ is as follows: (l, γ)
d
↪→ (l, γ + d) if d ∈ R+
(l, γ)
α
↪→ (l′, γ′) if l [g]α{r}−−−−→ l′, γ |= g, and γ′ = γ[r]
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4.2 Automatic Compositional Verification for TTS
To automate AGR for real-time systems, we use the CEGAR approach to generate
the appropriate real-time assumptions needed by AGR. Section 4.2.1 describes
how an abstraction for a TTS is constructed and how it is refined according to
counterexamples. Section 4.2.2 introduces our AGAR approach that combines
AGR and CEGAR to automate compositional verification for real-time systems
modelled by TTS.
4.2.1 Abstraction Refinement for TTS
In real-time model checking, zone abstraction technique is adopted, the con-
structed zone graph could be the size of the system’s region graph in the worst
case. Thus, one direction of abstraction can be clock variable omission. Defini-
tion 11 formulates the concept of abstraction by clock variable omission.
Definition 11 (Clock Variable omission) Given a TTS T = (Σ, C, L, L0, Lf , ↪→
), an abstraction of T by clock variable omission is a TTS Tˆ = (Σ, Cˆ, L, L0, Lf , ˆ↪→)
such that Cˆ ⊆ C and the guards of some transitions in ˆ↪→ become weakened by
omitting the variables in (C − Cˆ).
Another direction of abstraction is grouping location because the less locations
the assumption has, the more benefit AGR brings. Definition 12 formulates the
concept of abstraction by grouping locations.
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Definition 12 (Location Grouping) Given a TTS M = (Σ, C, L, L0, Lf , ↪→), an
abstraction of M by location grouping is a TTS Mˆ = (Σ, C, Lˆ, Lˆ0, Lˆf , ˆ↪→) such
that there exists an abstraction function ψ : L 7→ Lˆ that maps each concrete
location l ∈ L to a abstract location lˆ ∈ Lˆ, ψ(L0) ⊆ Lˆ0, and ψ(Lf ) ⊆ Lˆf . The
concretization function ψ−1 : Lˆ 7→ L is defined as ψ−1(lˆ) = {l ∈ L | ψ(l) = lˆ′}.
The abstract transition relation ˆ↪→ is defined as follows: (lˆ, lˆ′, α, r, g) ∈ ˆ↪→ for
lˆ, lˆ′ ∈ Lˆ iff (l, l′, α, r, g) ∈↪→ for some l ∈ ψ−1(lˆ) and l′ ∈ ψ−1(lˆ′).
Note that the concretization function ψ−1 induces a partition on L, that is, L =⋃
lˆ∈Lˆ ψ
−1(lˆ). Both the two abstraction techniques are considered on our real-time
model abstraction. A trivial abstraction is obtained by abstracting away all the
clock variables except the ones appearing in the given property using clock vari-
able omission abstraction as well as mapping all concrete locations into a single
abstract location using location grouping abstraction. Figure 4.3 (a) shows the
trivial abstraction of the OUTPUT component in the I/O system as shown in Fig-
ure 4.1 and we assume the safety TTS in Figure 4.2 to be the property. In this triv-
ial abstraction, all the concrete locations are mapped to one abstract location in the
abstraction and the clock variable y is omitted. Another abstraction of the OUT-
PUT component with two abstract locations is as shown in Figure 4.3 (b) where
concrete locations O0 and O2 are mapped to abstract location Oˆ0, and concrete
location O1 is mapped into abstract location Oˆ1. In addition, the clock variable y
and its associated guard conditions are added into the abstraction.
Given a TTS T and one of its abstractions Tˆ , we can easily observe that every
run in T can be simulated in Tˆ , i.e., the timed runs of the concrete model T are
a subset of that of the abstract model Tˆ . Thus, our abstraction definitions both













[y ≤ 1] output {y}
[y ≤ 1] ack {y}
(b) ˆTout
′
Figure 4.3: Abstractions of the OUTPUT Component
define a weak simulation relation [73] between a TTS T and its abstraction Tˆ , and
it is well-known that weak simulation implies trace inclusion [73]. Thus, we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given a TTS T and its abstraction Tˆ , T |= Tˆ .
To alleviate the state space explosion problem, model checking is performed on
the abstract model Tˆ instead of the concrete one T because the number of loca-
tions of Tˆ is smaller than T and the clock variables are fewer. Given a safety prop-
erty ϕ represented by a safe TTS Tϕ, if Tˆ |= Tϕ, then we can conclude T |= Tϕ
according to Proposition 1. If Tˆ violates Tϕ with an abstract counterexample pˆi
provided, pˆi has to be further analysed. If pˆi is not spurious, i.e., it is also feasible
on T , then we can conclude T 6|= Tϕ. If pˆi is spurious, the abstraction Tˆ has to be
refined. Algorithm 1 gives a procedure for abstract counterexample analysis and
abstraction refinement if the abstract counterexample pˆi is spurious.
Let lˆ0
[g1]α1 {r1}−−−−−−→ lˆ1 [g2]α2 {r2}−−−−−−→ lˆ2 [g3]α3 {r3}−−−−−−→ · · · [gn]αn {rn}−−−−−−→ lˆn be the run of pˆi
on the abstraction Mˆ = (Σ, C, Lˆ, Lˆ0, Lˆf , ˆ↪→) where lˆo ∈ Lˆ0 and lˆi ∈ Lˆ for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We need to check whether the abstract counterexample is with
the concrete model, if yes, we can conclude the real counterexample, otherwise
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the counterexample is spurious. To check whether pˆi is spurious, Algorithm 1
simulates pˆi step by step on the concrete locations. If the counterexample is spu-
rious, the algorithm simply splits the abstract location into two parts, otherwise
the algorithm return yes and the run on the concrete model that concretizes the
counterexample. The details of Algorithm 1 are described as follows.
• In step i, compute Ei−1 = {l ∈ ψ−1( ˆli−1) | Post(l, αi, gi) ∩ ψ−1(lˆi) 6=
∅}, i.e., Ei−1 includes all the concrete locations in ψ−1( ˆli−1) that have a
transition to concrete locations in ψ−1(lˆi) and the transition is the ith step of
pˆi.
• In step i, compute Si = {l′ ∈ Post(l, αi, gi) | l ∈ Ei−1 ∩ Si−1}, i.e., Si
includes all the concrete locations in ψ−1(lˆi) that are reachable after step i
is performed.
• If Si = ∅, step i of the abstract counterexample pˆi is broken in the concrete
model M , as shown in Figure 4.4, which means that pˆi is spurious. The
abstract location ˆli−1 is split into two new abstract locations lˆp and lˆq such
that ψ−1(lˆq) = Ei−1 and ψ−1(lˆp) = ψ−1( ˆli−1) \ ψ−1(lˆq), as shown in Fig-
ure 4.5 (a). Actually, the reason for Si = ∅ is because Si−1 ∩ Ei−1 = ∅.
Thus, any refinement that separates Si−1 and Ei−1 into two different ab-
stract locations would be a valid refinement, which is proved in Lemma 1.
Other two possible splitting strategies are as shown in Figs. 4.5 (b) and (c),
respectively.
• If Sn 6= ∅, pˆi is not spurious with location abstraction and return pi as the
concrete counterexample.
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Algorithm 1: Counterexample Analysis and Abstraction Refinement by lo-
cation grouping
input : T : concrete model; Tˆ : abstract model; pˆi: abstract counterexample
output: (false/true, a refined abstraction Tˆ ′)/concrete counterexample pi
1 Let pˆi : lˆ0
[g1]α1 {r1}−−−−−−→ lˆ1 [g2]α2 {r2}−−−−−−→ lˆ2 [g3]α3 {r3}−−−−−−→ · · · [gn]αn {rn}−−−−−−→ lˆn;
2 i←− 0;
3 S0 ←− L0;
4 while Si 6= ∅ and i ≤ n− 1 do
5 i←− i+ 1;
6 Ei−1 ←− {l ∈ ψ−1( ˆli−1) | Post(l, αi, gi) ∩ ψ−1(lˆi) 6= ∅};
7 Si ←− {l′ ∈ Post(l, αi, gi) | l ∈ Ei−1 ∩ Si−1};
8 if Si = ∅ then
9 split ˆli−1 into two new abstract locations lˆp and lˆq such that
ψ−1(lˆq) = Ei−1 and ψ−1(lˆp) = ψ−1( ˆli−1) \ ψ−1(lˆq);
10 build a new abstraction Mˆ ′ with Lˆ′ = Lˆ \ { ˆli−1} ∪ {lˆp, lˆq};
11 return (false, Mˆ ′);
12 else return (true, pi);










Figure 4.4: Abstraction Refinement
Lemma 1 If an abstract counterexample pˆi is spurious, after the refinement by
Algorithm 1, pˆi is not contained in the refined abstraction Tˆ ′.
Proof 1 Let lˆ0
[g1]α1 {r1}−−−−−−→ lˆ1 [g2]α2 {r2}−−−−−−→ lˆ2 [g3]α3 {r3}−−−−−−→ · · · [gn]αn {rn}−−−−−−→ lˆn be the
















Figure 4.5: Splitting Strategies
run of pˆi on the abstraction Tˆ = (Σ, C, Lˆ, Lˆ0, Lˆf , ˆ↪→) where lˆo ∈ Lˆ0 and lˆi ∈ Lˆ
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Suppose the abstract counterexample pˆi is concluded to be
spurious in step i because Si = ∅, which implies Ei−1 ∩ Si−1 = ∅. Algorithm 1
splits ˆli−1 into two abstract locations lˆp and lˆq such that ψ−1(lˆq) = Ei−1 and
ψ−1(lˆp) = ψ−1( ˆli−1) \ ψ−1(lˆq), i.e., Si−1 and Ei−1 are separated into two loca-
tions, as shown in Figure 4.5. After the split, there is no any concrete transition
l
[gi]αi {ri}−−−−−−→ l′ where l ∈ ψ−1(lˆp) and l′ ∈ ψ−1(lˆi), which implies that there is
no abstraction transition lˆp
[gi]αi {ri}−−−−−−→ lˆi in the refined abstraction Mˆ ′. Thus, the
abstract counterexample pˆi is broken in Tˆ ′, i.e., pˆi is not contained in the refined
abstraction Tˆ ′.
After performing Algorithm 1, either the abstraction would be refined or the con-
crete counterexample would be returned. However, it is still far from concluding
the concrete counterexample would lead to a real bug with the system design,
because it may be brought by clock variable omission abstraction. Algorithm 2
describes the procedure of checking if the counterexample is brought by the clock
variable omission. The details of Algorithm 2 aer described as follows.
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• At first, absolute time with each location is attached and it indicates the
right time when the outgoing transition is triggered. This operation basically
generates a timed word. The remaining task is to check if the absolute time
when triggering an transition on the abstract model could also trigger the
associated transition in the concrete one.
• Then evaluate each clock variable on each concrete location in the concrete
counterexample. Given a clock variable c, let cj denote the value of c on the
jth location. The function update(cj−1, lj, lj−1) determines the value of cj ,
and it is defined as follows. On initial location, the value of c0 equals the
absolute time; if the clock c is reset when taking transition from the (j−1)th
location to jth location, the value of cj equals the difference of the absolute
values on these two locations; otherwise, cj equals the sum of cj−1 and the
difference of the absolute timed values.
• With the clock values on each location, assert if the guard of the outgoing
transition is violated by any assignment of the clock values. If so, adding
these clock variable into the refined abstraction Tˆ ′ and return false.
• If not any clock variable need to be added, the algorithm returns with true.
With these two abstraction methods, we are able to generate and refine the abstrac-
tions which are usually smaller compared to the concrete model. In the following
subsection, we show how abstraction refinement technique works with AGR.
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Algorithm 2: Counterexample Analysis and Abstraction Refinement by
Clock Omission
input : T : concrete model; pˆi: abstract counterexample with length m; pi:
concrete counterexample; C: set of clock variables
output: (false/true, a refined abstraction by adding back clock variable :
Tˆ ′/real counterexample: pi
1 Calculate the absolute time for each location lˆi;
2 j ←− 0;
3 while j ≤ m do
4 for each Clock var c ∈ C do
5 cj ←− update(cj−1, lˆj, ˆlj−1);
6 j ←− j + 1;
7 if value in C make guard of transition in T violated then
8 Add the clock variable associated with the violated condition into
P ;
9 Put P into Tˆ ;
10 return false;
11 return true;
4.2.2 Assume-Guarantee Abstraction Refinement
Let us recall the AG-NC proof rule, as shown in Figure 4.6 (a). The basic idea
of our AGAR approach is to use the CEGAR approach to automatically generate
the assumption A. If the assumption A is constructed as Mˆ2, an abstraction of
M2, then the second premise, as shown in 4.6 (b), holds for free according to
Proposition 1. By combining AGR and CEGAR in such a way, both advantages
are taken, and AGR can be fully automated.
The overall flow of our AGAR approach matches the AGAR paradigm presented
in Chapter 2, and Algorithm 3 gives the corresponding pseudo-code. The details
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M1 ‖ A |= ϕ
M2 |= A
M1 ‖M2 |= ϕ
(a)
M1 ‖ Mˆ2 |= ϕ
M2 |= Mˆ2
M1 ‖M2 |= ϕ
(b)
Figure 4.6: Combining AGR and CEGAR
of Algorithm 3 are described as follows.
1. Initially, the abstraction Tˆ2 is constructed as the trivial abstraction of T2.
2. Check whether T1 ‖ Tˆ2 |= ϕ holds.
• If it holds, then we can conclude that T1 ‖ T2 |= ϕ also holds.
• If T1 ‖ Tˆ2 6|= ϕwith a counterexample pˆi, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2
are used to check whether pˆi is spurious.
– If pˆi is also a real concrete counterexample, then we can conclude
T1 ‖ T2 6|= ϕ.
– If pˆi is spurious, Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2 returns a refined
abstraction Tˆ2. Go to step (2) to check whether T1 ‖ Tˆ2 holds
again until we get a conclusive result.
The correctness of our AGAR approach is proved in Theorem 1, and the termina-
tion is proved in Theorem 2.
Theorem 1 Our AGAR approach is correct.
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Algorithm 3: AGAR
input : T1 and T2: component TTSs; T¬ϕ: an error TTS
output: (true/false, a counterexample)
1 Tˆ2 ←− the trivial abstraction of T2;
2 while true do
3 if L(T1 ‖ Tˆ2 ‖ T¬ϕ) = ∅ then
4 return (true, λ);
5 else
6 Let pˆi ∈ L(T1 ‖ Tˆ2 ‖ T¬ϕ) be a counterexample;
7 (result, Tˆ ′2)←− Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2(T2, Tˆ2, pˆi↓ΣT2 );
8 if result = false then
9 Tˆ2 ←− Tˆ ′2;
10 else return (false, pˆi);
Proof 2 The output of our AGAR approach is either true or false with a coun-
terexample. We want to prove that if T1 ‖ T2 |= Tϕ, AGAR returns true; other-
wise, it returns false with a counterexample. AGAR terminates in two cases: (1)
T1 ‖ Tˆ2 |= Tϕ holds and AGAR return yes, or (2) an abstract counterexample pˆi
is not spurious and AGAR returns false with pˆi. In case (1), since T1 ‖ Tˆ2 |= Tϕ
and T2 |= Tˆ2 (Proposition 1), we can conclude that T1 ‖ T2 |= Tϕ. That is,
AGAR returns yes when T1 ‖ T2 |= Tϕ. In case (2), the abstract counterexample
pˆi ∈ L(T1 ‖ Tˆ2 ‖ T¬ϕ) is not spurious, which means that pˆi is a common be-
haviour of T1 and T2 that violates the property Tϕ. That is, AGAR returns false
with pˆi when T1 ‖ T2 6|= Tϕ.
Theorem 2 Our AGAR approach terminates.
Proof 3 Suppose T2 has n locations and m clock variables. Let Tˆ i2 be the ab-
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straction obtained after the i-th iteration of AGAR. Initially, AGAR constructs a
trivial abstraction Tˆ 02 with single location and minimal 0 clock variables. In each
iteration of AGAR, if an abstract counterexample is found to be spurious, either
AGAR splits one abstract location into at least two new abstract locations, i.e., the
number of locations of Tˆ i2 is i+1 or a clock variable is added into the abstraction,
i.e., the number of clocks in the abstraction increments by 1. In the worst case,
AGAR takes (n+m− 1)-th iterations to refine the abstraction as M2, and a con-
clusive result can always be concluded by checking whether T1 ‖ T2 |= ϕ holds.
Thus, our AGAR approach terminates within n+m iterations in the worst case.
Generalization. Although the proposed compositional approach for verifying
real-time systems is presented in the context of two components, it can be easily
extended for more than two components. If a system consists of n components
modelled by T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}where n ≥ 3, one can partition the components
into two higher level components to fit the AG-NC proof rule, e.g., if n = 4, we
can obtain H1 = T1 ‖ T2 and H2 = T3 ‖ T4 and apply our approach on H1
and H2. However, we found that the ways of partitioning components affect the
verification result significantly. An investigation [36] reported that finding the best
partition is hard. In our implementation, we use a heuristic that collects in H1 the
components containing the events specified in the property automata, i.e., if an
event a is contained in the property automata, then each component containing
the event a is classified into H1. Our experiments show that the heuristic yielded
good performance in most of the cases.
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4.3 Discussions and Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented the detailed algorithm of AGAR approach for
real-time systems modelled by TTS. Since TTS serves as the underline semantic
of various real-time modelling languages such as TA and ERA1, this approach is
able to support various types of real-time models. This approach has been imple-
mented in the CELL framework to support real-time verification. It is supported
by the two real-time model checkers we built with CELL. The evaluation of CTA
for AGAR approach is available online2. The experimental results confirm the
effectiveness of our approach.




Compositional verification is a promising technique to alleviate the state explo-
sion problem associated with model checking. In recent years, a number of auto-
matic compositional verification techniques have been proposed. Different com-
positional verification approaches need different learning/abstraction refinement
algorithms and model checking methods. To this end, we propose a comprehen-
sive and extensible compositional verification framework. Currently, it consists of
seven compositional verification approaches for concurrent systems and three for
real-time systems. In the previous chapters of this thesis, we presented two works,
namely the compositional verification framework CELL and AGAR for real-time
systems.
In Chapter 3, we presented how we categorized compositional verification ap-
proaches and how we designed and implemented the CELL framework. We uti-
lized the commonly used semantic models to be the interfaces, i.e., LTS for con-
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current systems and TTS for real-time systems. Under each semantic model, three
libraries were offered, i.e., compositional verification paradigms, learning algo-
rithms and model checking methods. Compositional verification approaches can
be constructed by mixing and matching of combing items from the three libraries.
The experimental results showed the efficiency of the algorithms and our promis-
ing implementation. Moreover, we designed the framework to be extensible.
New features could be added easily, i.e., new semantic models (Markov Decision
Process for probabilistic model checking), new learning algorithms, new model
checking methods and new compositional verification approaches constructed by
the new add-ins. The well-defined APIs of CELL are able to help developers to
manufacture customized concurrent and real-time model checkers with various
advanced compositional verification techniques.
In Chapter 4, we presented a new approach for compositional verification of real-
time systems modelled by Timed Transition System, namely Assume-Guarantee
Abstraction Refinement (AGAR) for real-time systems. This approach exploited
the CEGAR to construct real-time assumption for Assume-Guarantee Reasoning
(AGR), which was mainly based on the AG-NC proof rule. We showed how to
construct and refine real-time abstraction and how to utilize the abstraction to
work with AGR. We proved the correctness and termination of our approach.
These two works are highly related. This thesis mainly intends to propose a com-
positional verification framework for concurrent and real-time systems. The mo-
tivation to build such a system is to provide a platform to systematically experi-
ment, apply and compare various compositional verification approaches. AGAR
for real-time systems complements the real-time verification options in CELL. On
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the other hand, the second work is beneficial from CELL in quickly implement-
ing and comparing with other related techniques, such as LAGR based approach,
CAR based approach and monolithic approach. AGAR is fine tuned and included
into CELL as components.
Chapter 6
Future works
In this chapter, we identify several future research directions regarding to the cur-
rent works.
Firstly, as illustrated in [36], compositional verification techniques such as AGR
techniques encounter problems with some cases. For some systems, the perfor-
mance of compositional verification is worse than the monolithic approach. On
the other hand, for AGR with AG-NC proof rule, the strategy to partition the sys-
tem affects the performance significantly. Therefore, it is desirable to define a rule
to identify if the system is amenable for compositional verification technique and
how to find the best partition strategy.
Secondly, our current work is not so feasible in supporting shared variables. We
plan to utilize other abstraction techniques such as predicate abstraction to en-
hance CELL.
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Thirdly, the essence of the CEGAR approach for TTS that we adopt is to abstract
clock variables away and aggregate the locations. These strategies may result in
bad performance in some cases. To improve it, we would combine it with other
abstraction techniques.
Fourthly, since EAT approach yields good performance, we plan to enhance it with
better encoding strategy to achieve even better performance and finally support
real-time and probabilistic systems.
Finally, as probabilistic model checking techniques have attracted much attention
and several compositional verification approaches for probabilistic systems have
been proposed, it is desirable to extend our system to support MDP semantic
model as well as other algorithms that are needed to do compositional verification
for probabilistic systems.
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